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Abstract. To support information security, organizations deploy Intrusion De-
tection Systems (IDS) that monitor information systems and networks, generat-
ing alerts for every suspicious behavior. However, the huge amount of alerts
that an IDS triggers and their low-level representation make the alerts anal-
ysis a challenging task. In this paper, we propose a new approach based on
hierarchical clustering that supports intrusion alert analysis in two main steps.
First, it correlates historical alerts to identify the most common strategies at-
tackers have used. Then, it associates upcoming alerts in real time according
to the strategies discovered in the first step. The experiments were performed
using a real dataset from the University of Maryland. The results showed that
the proposed approach could properly identify the attack strategy patterns from
historical alerts, and organize the upcoming alerts into a smaller amount of
meaningful hyper-alerts.
1. Introduction
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) plays a significant role in modern
organizations, bringing many benefits concerning facility and productivity. Information
is a valuable asset to every organization and its value dramatically increased in recent
years [Shameli-Sendi et al. 2016]. Therefore, a security incident may cause loss of pro-
ductivity, resources and reputation [Ahmad et al. 2012]. Incident management performs
an important task for the information security of an organization, which defines processes
to detect, analyze and respond to an incident [Ruefle et al. 2014].
Network or system intrusions can cause security incidents. Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) are devices used to monitor information systems and networks for these in-
trusions. When the IDS detects a sign of security violation, it generates an alert and saves
them into a log file. A better understanding of intrusions is possible by the analysis of
alerts that the IDS triggers. Thereby, a security administrator can have a better situational
awareness of the intrusions and efficiently respond to it. However, IDS tends to generate
a huge amount of alerts. Moreover, each IDS alert presents low-level information, such as
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timestamp, source and destination IP address, ports, and signature. Therefore, the manual
analysis of the IDS alerts becomes a time consuming and error prone task [Julisch 2003].
Two main problems in the intrusion alert analysis field have been approached in
the literature. The first problem is the huge amount of alerts generated by IDS. To solve
this problem, approaches to reduce the quantity of alerts using filtering and aggregation
methods have been proposed [Julisch 2003, Spathoulas and Katsikas 2013]. The second
problem is related to the low-level information of a single alert. A complete attack is
composed of a sequence of attack steps (e. g., reconnaissance, vulnerability identification,
and vulnerability exploit [Liu et al. 2008]). Therefore, instead of a single alert, a group
of correlated alerts is required to represent a complete attack. Approaches to extract
meaningful information of the correlated alerts, such as the attack strategies (sequence of
alert signatures), have also been proposed [Treinen and Thurimella 2006, Liu et al. 2010].
In this work, we propose a new approach to assist the security analyst in the in-
trusion alert analysis, addressing the aforementioned problems. The proposed approach
is composed of two elements: the offline correlator and the online correlator. The offline
correlator aggregates historical alerts into attack scenarios using the connected compo-
nents method, extracts attack strategy graphs and uses hierarchical clustering to group
similar attack strategy graphs. For this, a new method to compare the similarity between
two attack strategy graphs is also proposed. The attack characteristics of each generated
cluster are then identified.
The online correlator generates hyper-alerts which contain useful attributes that
assist the security analyst. A hyper-alert is composed by different low-level alerts and
it is updated in real time as the upcoming low-level alerts are triggered. Considering
the hypothesis that a previous attack strategy can be performed again in the future, each
hyper-alert is associated with a cluster that the offline correlator defined previously. By
analyzing the cluster information, the security analyst can better understand the char-
acteristics of an attack when only the first alerts are available. The experiments were
performed using a real dataset gathered by an IDS device deployed at the University of
Maryland with about 40,000 computers.
The main contributions of this paper are: (a) a new correlation method that stud-
ies the past alerts and generates an information structure known as hyper-alerts, which
describe the upcoming attack scenarios; (b) a new technique based on Jaccard Index to
compare attack strategy graphs.
In the contribution (a), the proposed correlator could organize the huge amount of
past alerts and identify the attack strategy patterns used previously. With the knowledge
of the previous attack strategy patterns, the online correlator was able to summarize the
upcoming alerts into a smaller amount of hyper-alerts that describe the upcoming attack
scenarios. The attack scenario of each hyper-alert was associated to one of the attack strat-
egy patterns, anticipating the nature of the attack. The results showed that the most of the
attack strategies that the online correlator identified were similar to the attack strategies
that the offline correlator discovered. This result strengthens the hypothesis that a previ-
ous attack strategy has a significant probability of being adopted again in the future. The
contribution (b) is a new alternative to address the comparison of attack strategy graphs.
This alternative could assist the hierarchical clustering to group the most similar attack
KAWAKANI C. T.; BARBON JR, S.; MIANI, R. S.; CUKIER, M.; ZARPELÃO, B. B.
Discovering Attackers Past Behavior to Generate Online Hyper-Alerts
iSys | Revista Brasileira de Sistemas de Informação, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 122-147, 2017
strategies and identify the attack strategy patterns.
This paper is an extended version of a previous work [Kawakani et al. 2016] and
includes a new section about Intrusion Detection Systems, the study of additional related
work, an improved explanation of the proposed approach, and new experiments and re-
sults focusing on the variation of the alerts sample size used in the offline correlator. The
rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 makes a brief summary of Intrusion
Detection Systems, Section 3 presents the related work, Section 4 explains the offline and
online correlators, Section 5 discusses the experiments and analyzes the results. Section
6 concludes this paper.
2. Intrusion Detection Systems
Security intrusion is a security event (or a combination of multiple security events) in
which an intruder, with a set of actions, attempts to gain access to a system or disrupt the
normal operations of a system [Stallings and Brown 2007]. Security intrusions threaten
the integrity, confidentiality or availability of systems. Integrity ensures unauthorized
users will not modify the data. Confidentiality guarantees the data will not be available for
unauthorized users. Availability assures the data will always be accessible to authorized
users.
To protect against intrusions, many layers of security can be used, such as user au-
thentication, access control, and firewalls. Another layer of security may be the intrusion
detection system (IDS). IDS is a software or a hardware device placed in computers or net-
works to detect suspicious activities, for example, unauthorized entry or file modification.
When the IDS detects suspicious activity, it can display an alert or write the information
about the event in a log file. Thereby, a security analyst can use this information to assist
the system defense. An IDS can act proactively, attempting to stop possible intrusions.
This kind of IDS is referred to as Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) [Patel et al. 2010,
Scarfone and Mell 2007, Stallings and Brown 2007, Stavroulakis and Stamp 2010].
However, an IDS alert shows low-level information, e.g., source IP address, desti-
nation IP address, timestamp and signature of the attack. A single alert does not provide
meaningful information to a security analyst. Furthermore, a massive amount of alerts
tends to be generated when an IDS monitors a large network. For example, the dataset
used in this work contains about 82 million alerts. This dataset was generated by an IDS
deployed at the University of Maryland from April 2012 to March 2013. Therefore, the
analysis of correlated alerts becomes more interesting than the analysis of single alerts.
2.1. Types of IDS
IDSs can be designed to operate in the host (host-based IDS) or in the
network (network-based IDS), each one presenting different characteris-
tics [Patel et al. 2010, Scarfone and Mell 2007, Stallings and Brown 2007,
Stavroulakis and Stamp 2010, Debar 2002, Vacca 2013].
Host-based IDS was the first approach explored in intrusion detection. It aims to
monitor the events of a single component, such as a server, a client host or an application
service. These events can be detected in system logs, applications activity, file changes,
system setting changes and host traffic. When a host-based IDS detects suspicious activ-
ity, it generates an alert with different attributes, such as timestamp, alert type, and rating
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(e.g., priority, severity). Besides, depending on the alert type, some specific attributes are
also informed (when available), such as user ID, application information or IP address
and port information [Scarfone and Mell 2007].
With the increasing usage of the Internet, network attacks have become more
frequent. The purpose of network-based IDS is to detect suspicious activity regarding
network, transport and application protocols. Network-based IDSs are often placed at
the boundaries between different networks, near to border firewalls or routers. When
a network-based IDS detects suspicious activity, it generates an alert with some at-
tributes, such as timestamp, alert type, rating, source and destination IP addresses,
source and destination ports, and protocols of network, transport and application layers
[Scarfone and Mell 2007].
The alert logs that IDSs generate can be preprocessed, correlated and analyzed to
extract actionable information. Then, it may provide a better situational awareness of the
monitored system, helping the response to an incident and the improvement of the system
security.
2.2. IDS Detection Methods
IDSs detect security violations using different methods, such as signature-based,
anomaly-based and hybrid.
A signature is the description of a known threat pattern [Scarfone and Mell 2007].
The signature-based detection method attempts to detect possible threats by comparing
signatures with observed events [Scarfone and Mell 2007, Mitchell and Chen 2014]. If
the signature matches with the observed event, an alert is raised [Debar 2002]. For in-
stance, Snort1, one of the most popular IDS, has a signature in its database named ICMP
Ping Nmap. A Snort instance generates an alert with this signature when it detects an
ICMP ping with zero data size. This signature indicates a possible attempt of network
reconnaissance. The signature-based method is straightforward and efficient to detect
known threats [Scarfone and Mell 2007, Liao et al. 2013]. However, it is ineffective to
detect new attacks or variants of attacks and must often be updated to include new threats,
which takes time to be discovered [Debar 2002, Vacca 2013, Liao et al. 2013].
By presuming malicious activities have a different behavior from the normal sys-
tem activities, in anomaly-based detection, the IDS learns what behavior is normal for
a given system. With this knowledge, it separates the normal behavior from the ab-
normal behavior. Therefore, whether a deviation from the normal behavior of the sys-
tem is detected, an alert is generated. This method can detect new threats. However,
learning the normal behavior of a system is not a simple task, since the normal be-
havior can change over time, and anomalies may be only unusual events, not neces-
sarily an intrusion. Hence, anomaly-based IDSs may present high false positive rates
[Scarfone and Mell 2007, Debar 2002, Vacca 2013, Mitchell and Chen 2014].
The hybrid detection method integrates the signature-based and anomaly-based
detection into a single system, attempting to keep the advantages and overcome the draw-
backs of each method. Hybrid IDSs employ the signature matching due to its speed
and flexibility and the anomaly-based detection to identify unknown behaviors for further
1https://www.snort.org/
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analysis [Vacca 2013, Liao et al. 2013].
3. Related Work
Researchers have proposed different methods to assist intrusion alert analysis in recent
years. The proposed methods aim to reduce the number of alerts, discover relationships
between them and provide a visual representation for the correlated alerts.
Because of the enormous amount of alerts that IDSs trigger, Julisch (2003) pro-
poses an approach to handle the IDS alerts more efficiently. The proposed approach is
based on the root-cause detection. A root-cause is the reason for the occurrence of an
alert. Julisch claims that few root causes are responsible for 90% of the alerts. A clus-
tering technique is proposed to group the alerts, supporting the root-cause analysis. The
author evaluated the proposed approach with real data that was collected from a commer-
cially used network.
Treinen and Thurimella (2006) proposed a framework to discover new attack
strategies. Their objective was to feed an Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) with these
attack scenarios, allowing the automatic construction of alert correlation rules. First, IDS
alerts were grouped according to their related IP addresses using the connected compo-
nents method. Then, the researchers applied the association rule mining in each group
to find non-obvious associations between attack signatures and IP addresses. The results
showed the framework could find new association rules with high confidence. Impor-
tantly, each experiment was conducted with real data composed of alerts that IDS sensors
generated during 24 hours for 135 distinct production networks.
Liu et al. (2010) proposed a model that correlated the alerts into attack scenarios
and provided a visualization for them. First, the alerts were converted into a common
format and the false alerts were filtered. Then, using the alerts IP addresses, they were
correlated into three attack scenario types: (a) Process-critical scenario: represents the in-
trusion steps that one attacker performed against one victim; (b) Attacker-critical scenario:
represents the relationship between one attacker and many victims, and (c) Victim-critical
scenario: represents the relationship between many attackers and one victim. Finally, the
uncovered attack scenarios were represented as graphs. The experiments were performed
using experimental data generated from two attacks in an isolated and controlled environ-
ment. The results showed that the proposed model could provide a high-level visualization
of the alerts.
Lagzian et al. (2012) developed a method to correlate alerts and find the most
frequent attack scenarios. The method consisted of three main steps: alerts preprocess-
ing, alerts aggregation and attack scenario extraction. The preprocessing normalized and
converted alert data into a universal format. After that, the alerts with related IP addresses
were grouped, forming the attack scenarios. Then, the frequent pattern mining technique
Bit-AssocRule was applied to discover the most frequent attack scenarios. DARPA 2000
dataset was used to test the proposed method. The results showed it had a good perfor-
mance and could find the attack scenarios properly.
To improve the quality of intrusion alerts information, Spathoulas and Katsikas
(2013) propose a system to process the intrusion alerts that belong to multiple IDSs and
provide a high-level presentation of the security events. For this, the alerts that have the
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same source and destination IP addresses, same attack identifier and are close in time are
grouped. Then, the similar groups are clustered, and for each cluster, a visual representa-
tion is provided. The proposed system was evaluated using the DARPA 2000 dataset and
an academic dataset generated by attack simulation.
Ghasemigol and Ghaemi-Bafghi (2015) proposed a system that correlates intru-
sion alerts using their entropy. The goal of the proposed system is to find causal rela-
tionships between the intrusion alerts, providing a high-level representation of the attack
scenario. First, the number of alerts is reduced using data aggregation. Data aggregation
is applied to group the alerts in clusters and the graphs of the clusters are generated for
visualization. The authors reached a rate of 99.98% of data reduction using the DARPA
2000 dataset to evaluate the proposed system.
Works of Liu et al. (2010), Lagzian et al. (2012), Spathoulas and Katsikas
(2013), and Ghasemigol and Ghaemi-Bafghi (2015) performed their tests using experi-
mental datasets. However, experimental datasets (e.g. DARPA 2000 dataset) may show a
low capacity of representing a real environment, and this fact has been widely criticized
[McHugh 2000, Brown et al. 2009, Shiravi et al. 2012, Zuech et al. 2015]. Unlike many
approaches in the alert correlation field, this work is evaluated with a real world dataset,
generated by an IDS deployed in a large scale network at the University of Maryland.
Considering that one attacker performs multiple attack steps to reach its goal,
Xuewei et al. (2014) proposed an approach to automatically identify the multistage at-
tacks in intrusion alerts. First, alerts are clustered by related IP addresses using the method
of connected components. Then, for each cluster, a directed graph that represents the at-
tacker steps is generated. Each node in the graph represents an attack type, and each edge
contains the probability of an attack type follows another attack type. The connected
component method used by Xuewei et al. (2014) does not deal with the alerts times-
tamp. Therefore, alerts that are very distant in time can be grouped into the same attack
scenario. Moreover, the algorithm proposed by the authors does not consider to merge
two connected components if the source and destination IP addresses of an alert under
analysis are already contained in these connected components. In this work, we apply the
connected component method taking into consideration these two issues.
Alvarenga et al. (2015) proposed an offline approach which applies process min-
ing techniques to analyze past IDS alerts and discover attack strategies. The main goal is
to provide an intuitive visual representation of the discovered attack strategies. The pro-
posed approach was evaluated using a real dataset from the University of Maryland. The
results showed that the proposed approach could combine visual features with quantitative
measures to assist the analysis of the past IDS alerts. As well as the work of Alvarenga et
al. (2015), this work has an offline phase to extract the attack strategies from the past IDS
alerts. Additionally, we also present an online phase which uses the information observed
in the offline phase to assist the analysis of the upcoming IDS alerts.
Shittu et al. (2015) proposed a framework for intrusion alert analysis. The pro-
posed framework reduces the quantity of false positive alerts and uses correlation methods
to generate hyper-alerts, referred to as correlated alert graphs. A metric for prioritizing
hyper-alerts and a method to cluster the similar hyper-alerts using DBSCAN were pre-
sented. Graph Edit Distance was used to compute the similarity between the correlated
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alert graphs. The dataset used to test the framework belongs to the 2012 cyber range ex-
periment that industrial partners of the British Telecom Security Practice Team performed.
As seen in Section 4, the Graph Edit Distance technique presented some performance is-
sues when applied to our attack strategy graphs. Therefore, in this work we propose a new
method based on the Jaccard index to measure the similarity between two attack strategy
graphs.
This work proposes a new offline correlation method that organizes the past alerts
and identifies the attack strategies that the attackers adopted. Then, the similar attack
strategies are grouped using agglomerative hierarchical clustering with Ward’s method.
A new approach based on Jaccard index was developed to measure the similarity between
two attack strategies. Each cluster of similar attack strategies can represent an attack
strategy pattern.
Furthermore, a new online correlation method is proposed. The online correlation
method generates or updates hyper-alerts as the IDS triggers new alerts. Each hyper-alert
comprises new attributes that help the security analyst to understand the attacks. Fol-
lowing the hypothesis that an attack strategy used in the past may repeat in the future,
each hyper-alert is associated with one attack strategy pattern found by the offline corre-
lation method. It is important to emphasize that a real dataset was used to evaluate the
correlation method.
4. Proposed Approach
To address the main challenges related to intrusion alert analysis, i.e., the huge amount
of alerts generated by IDSs, and the low-level information provided, this work proposes
a new approach to generate online hyper-alerts based on the attackers past behavior. The
proposed approach is composed of two correlators: the offline correlator and the online
correlator. The offline correlator receives as input a set of past IDS alerts and identifies the
attack strategy patterns to be used in the online correlation. The online correlator analyzes
the incoming alerts in real time and generates hyper-alerts that gather information about
groups of correlated alerts. Furthermore, considering the hypothesis that an attack strategy
adopted in the past may be employed again in the future, each hyper-alert is associated
with an attack strategy pattern that the offline correlator identified. These two correlators
are described in the next subsections.
4.1. Offline Correlator
The offline correlator aims to organize a set of historical IDS alerts into clusters, giv-
ing a better understanding of the attacks. For this, the first step consists of separating
the alerts using the connected component method, identifying the attack scenarios (ag-
gregation step). Then, the attack strategy of each scenario is extracted and represented
by attack strategy graphs. Considering the possibility of many attack strategy graphs be
similar, they are grouped into clusters using hierarchical clustering techniques (clustering
step). Each cluster represents one attack strategy pattern. Figure 1 presents an overview
of the offline correlator. This process is detailed next.
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Figure 1. Offline correlator overview.
Let s, d, t, k be the source IP address, the destination IP address, the timestamp
and the attack signature of an alert, respectively. Then, an alert A is defined as the 4-tuple
A = 〈s, d, t, k〉. The offline correlator uses the IP address and timestamp information to
organize the alerts. This organization is based on the method that Treinen and Thurimella
(2006) used in their work, referred to as the connected component method. In the aggrega-
tion step, the connected component organization separates the alerts by their IP addresses.
If the alerts have related IP addresses, i.e. A1.s = A2.s or A1.d = A2.d or A1.s = A2.d or
A1.d = A2.s, then they are grouped. In this work, another condition must be satisfied to
group the alerts: the alerts must have a difference of timestamps shorter than x minutes,
i.e. A2.t − A1.t < x minutes. Each group built by the connected component method
represents one attack scenario, in which all alerts have related IP addresses and are close
in time.
A connected component is a visual representation of an attack scenario and is
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defined as a directed graph CC = (V,E), where the set of vertex V represents the IP
addresses, and the directed edges E represents the direction of the attack (from source to
destination).
As a first example, consider the set of alerts presented in Table 1. Two attack
scenarios can be identified using the connected component separation method. Figure 2
shows the visual representation of each attack scenario.
Table 1. First example of IDS alerts.
Time Source Destination Signature
01/01/2016 00:30:00 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.1 A
01/01/2016 00:35:00 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 B
01/01/2016 00:40:00 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.3 C
01/01/2016 00:45:00 10.0.0.64 10.0.0.65 D
01/01/2016 00:50:00 10.0.0.64 10.0.0.65 D
01/01/2016 00:55:00 10.0.0.64 10.0.0.65 E
01/01/2016 01:00:00 10.0.0.64 10.0.0.65 F
Figure 2. Connected components for the first example of IDS alerts.
Another example, from Table 2, highlights the importance of the condition related
to the difference of timestamps of alerts with related IP addresses. All of the alerts in
Table 2 have related IP addresses, but three of them were recorded hours after the first
ones. Considering a maximum time of 60 minutes for the difference of timestamps of
alerts with related IP addresses, the first three alerts compose one attack scenario, and the
last three alerts compose another attack scenario, illustrated in Figure 3.
Table 2. Second example of IDS alerts.
Time Source Destination Signature
01/01/2016 00:00:00 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.1 A
01/01/2016 00:40:00 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 B
01/01/2016 01:20:00 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.3 B
01/01/2016 10:00:00 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.4 A
01/01/2016 10:40:00 10.0.0.4 10.0.0.5 B
01/01/2016 11:20:00 10.0.0.4 10.0.0.6 B
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Figure 3. Connected components for the second example of IDS alerts.
Using the alerts signature and timestamp makes it possible to determine the se-
quence of signatures triggered in each attack scenario. The sequence of signatures is
represented in a directed graph format, where each node represents one signature, and
each edge represents the sequential relationship between the signatures. This graph is
named attack strategy graph. One attack strategy graph is generated for each attack sce-
nario. Figure 4 shows the attack strategy graphs created for each attack scenario of the
alerts from Table 1. Figure 5 shows the attack strategy graphs created for each attack
scenario of the alerts from Table 2.
Figure 4. Attack strategy graphs of the alerts in Table 1.
Figure 5. Attack strategy graphs of the alerts in Table 2.
The next step of the offline correlator is to group similar attack strategy graphs.
For this, a method to verify if two graphs are similar (or dissimilar) should be defined.
Ning and Xu (2003) calculated the similarity between two attack strategy graphs using the
Graph Edit Distance technique. The Graph Edit Distance technique measures how many
edit operations (node insertion, deletion or substitution, and edge insertion, deletion or
substitution) are required to transform one graph into another. The more edit operations
are needed, more dissimilar are two graphs.
However, this method showed to be inadequate to our attack strategy graphs due
to its performance when applied to graphs with many nodes or edges. Also, for smaller
graphs, the Graph Edit Distance is low even if the graphs are completely different, be-
cause few edit operations are necessary. Figure 6 demonstrates this problem: the cost
for both situations will be one node substitution (X for Y ), even taking into account that
the situation (a) shows similar nodes (A and B). Therefore, if two graphs have a lot of
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similar edges and nodes and only one different node, the Graph Edit Distance technique
will consider only the different node.
Figure 6. Example of attack strategy graphs for Graph Edit Distance and for the
new method based on Jaccard index.
Following this reasoning, we propose a new method to measure attack strategy
graph similarity. Attack strategy graphs are represented by a set of signatures (nodes),
and a set of relationship between signatures (directed edges). Therefore, the proposed
method is based on Jaccard index, which measures the similarity between two finite sets.
Considering M and N two finite sets, the Jaccard index between M and N is defined as
the size of the intersection of M and N , divided by the size of the union of M and N
(Equation 1) [Niwattanakul et al. 2013]. To measure the similarity between two attack
strategy graphs, two Jaccard indexes were calculated: first one Jaccard index J1 for all
nodes, then another Jaccard index J2 for all pair of nodes (representing the edges). To
give the same similarity influence for the nodes and edges, the mean of the two results
was considered the similarity S between two attack strategy graphs (Equation 2).
For the attack strategy graphs of the situation (a) in Figure 6, the similarity is
calculated as follows:
1. First, it is calculated the similarity J1 of nodes, which is the size of the inter-
section of the nodes, i.e. {A,B}, divided by the size of the union of nodes, i.e.
{A,B,X, Y }. Therefore, J1 = 2/4 = 0.5.
2. Then, it is calculated the similarity J2 of the edges, which is the size of the inter-
section of the edges, i.e. {A→ B}, divided by the size of the union of edges, i.e.
{A→ B,B → X,B → Y }. Therefore, J2 = 1/3 = 0.3.
3. The final similarity S is the mean between J1 and J2, which is 0.4.
J(M,N) =
|M ∩N |
|M ∪N | (1)
S =
J1 + J2
2
(2)
It is possible to have an empty set of edges (a graph with only one node). If both
compared graphs present empty edges, the final similarity S is simply defined by J1 (see
Equation 3). If both graphs are composed of only one node, the similarity between them
must be 1 if the nodes are equal, and 0 if the nodes are different.
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S = J1 (3)
With this new metric, the problem presented in Figure 6 is solved, because all
nodes and their edges are taken into consideration. Also, this metric does not present
performance problems, as observed with the Graph Edit Distance.
Using this new metric, all attack strategy graphs can be compared to generate a
similarity matrix. The similarity matrix is a square matrix with size n× n, where n is the
quantity of attack strategy graphs and the content of the matrix is the similarity (from 0 to
1) between two graphs.
Figure 7 shows an example of a similarity matrix, which indicates the similarity
between the graphs G1, G2, G3 and G4. Analyzing the content of this similarity matrix,
we can realize that G1 and G2 are similar to each other and different from G3 and G4.
Figure 7. Example of similarity matrix.
The similarity matrix is used as input to the agglomerative hierarchical cluster-
ing using Ward’s method [Ward Jr 1963, Macfarlane 1996]. Considering zik the set of
elements of a cluster k (which have nk elements), and considering z¯k the mean of the
elements, the sum of squared errors for cluster k is given by the Equation 4.
Ek =
nk∑
i=1
‖ zik − z¯k ‖2 (4)
Considering Ek defined by the Equation 4, the Ward’s method calculates the total
error sum of squares E for all g clusters using the Equation 5.
E =
g∑
k=1
Ek (5)
The agglomerative hierarchical clustering method begins with n clusters that con-
tain a single element (where n is the number of elements). Then it performs n−1 merging
steps. At each step, the two clusters that give the smallest increase in the total error of the
clusters are merged. The method ends with one cluster that contains all n elements. As a
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result, this method outputs a dendrogram, which is a tree that represents the entire clus-
tering process (Figure 8). The cutting height of the dendrogram that defines the number
of clusters is problem dependent [Jain et al. 1999, Xu and Wunsch 2005]. In this work,
the cutting height is defined as the value of the third quartile of the sorted set of heights,
which separates the 75% lower heights from the 25% higher heights [Kerns 2011].
Figure 8. Example of dendrogram for agglomerative hierarchical clustering using
Ward’s method.
Figure 8 illustrates an example of the agglomerative hierarchical clustering tech-
nique, where each height represents the square root of the total error of the clusters after a
merge between two clusters (calculated with Ward’s method) [Macfarlane 1996]. In this
example, the number of elements is four. Therefore, three (n − 1) merging steps were
required. The first merging step groups the clusters Y and Z, creating the new cluster
Y Z. The second merging step groups the clusters X and Y Z, creating the new cluster
XY Z. The last merging step groups the clusters XY Z and K, creating the new cluster
XY ZK. The dendrogram has been cut in the height 10.75 (third quartile of the heights
0, 3.2, 5.5 and 16). To compute the third quartile, at first, we applied the median to divide
the ordered heights into two halves. Then, we applied the median in the upper half to find
the third quartile value. Thus, two clusters were generated: the first cluster is composed
of the elements X , Y and Z and the second cluster is composed of the element K. In our
work, each element is an attack strategy.
After the offline correlation, we have all historical alerts separated into clusters
according to the relationships between attack steps. Each cluster groups similar attack
strategies and provides a summarized overview of them. The clusters information can be
used to support the analysis of the upcoming alerts by the online correlator.
4.2. Online Correlator
Using the connected component separation method, the online correlator separates the
alerts into attack scenarios as the IDS triggers them. For each attack scenario, one hyper-
alert is generated. A hyper-alert contains many attributes to describe its attack scenario.
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Figure 9 shows an hyper-alert A describing the attack scenario A. Table 3 lists and ex-
plains all hyper-alert attributes. The first column represents the category of the attributes,
the second column represents the attributes of each category, and the third column de-
scribes each category. These attributes assist the security management by giving a better
insight of each current attack scenario. As this correlator operates online, an attack sce-
nario can receive new alerts constantly. Therefore, the attributes of an hyper-alert are
updated whenever a new alert is added to the attack scenario it represents.
Figure 9. Hyper-alert A describing the attack scenario A.
One difference between the online and the offline correlator is that the online
correlator process the alerts as they are generated in real time. Therefore, for each new
alertA, it is verified ifA belongs to an existing attack scenario comparing the IP addresses
and timestamp (otherwise, A will belong to a new attack scenario). After determining to
which attack scenario the new alert belongs, the attack strategy graph of this scenario is
updated with the new alert A. Using Ward’s method (Equation 5), the online correlator
associates the updated attack strategy graph G with one of the attack strategy clusters that
the offline correlator found.
For example, Figure 10a illustrates a new alert A with source IP represented by
the number 21, destination IP represented by the number 15 and signature Y . Figure 10b
shows the inclusion of this alert in the proper attack scenario. Figure 10c demonstrates
the attack strategy graph being updated with the new signature Y . Finally, Figure 10d
shows the association of the updated attack strategy graph with the Cluster 2 (found by
the offline correlator).
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Figure 10. Online correlator overview.
Associating the updated attack strategy graph to a cluster provides useful informa-
tion for the security analyst, since each cluster contains information about typical attack
strategies that attackers have adopted against the network. This way, this association al-
lows anticipating the nature of the current attack by analyzing the attack strategy pattern
that the offline correlator found earlier.
As a result, the online correlator outputs hyper-alerts that describe each current
attack scenario. Also, the hyper-alert information is updated in real time as it receives a
new low-level alert. With this new information, the security analyst has a better situational
awareness of the environment in real time to react faster to a security event.
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Table 3. Hyper-alert information.
Attribute
Category
Attributes Description
Status infor-
mation
Status The hyper-alert is closed if no alert is added in x minutes.
Otherwise, it is under construction. If the hyper-alert is
closed, it means that it will not receive more alerts. Then,
this is the final state of the hyper-alert
Cluster infor-
mation
Associated cluster and in-
creased error
Reports the associated cluster for the hyper-alert and the
new error of the cluster, considering that the attack strat-
egy graph of this hyper-alert has been added to this cluster
(using Ward’s method). The bigger the error, the greater
the difference between the cluster and the attack strategy
graph
Time infor-
mation
Start time, end time and du-
ration
Reports the timestamp of the first and the last alert of the
hyper-alert and the difference in minutes between these
timestamps
Quantitative
information
Quantity of alerts, quantity
of distinct attackers, quan-
tity of distinct targets and
quantity of distinct signa-
tures
Counts the number of alerts, attackers, targets and signa-
tures that compose the hyper-alert
Address
information
The number of alerts trig-
gered per attacker IP address
and the number of alerts
triggered per target IP ad-
dress
This information is useful to determine which IP ad-
dresses trigger more alerts and which IP addresses receive
more attacks
Signature in-
formation
The number of alerts with
each signature and the attack
strategy graph
This information is useful to determine which signature
happens more often and to understand the causal relation-
ship between these signatures
Relationship
information
The connected component
and a list of relationships
One relationship consists of one source IP address, one
destination IP address, and the number of times that these
IP addresses appear in the same alert of the attack sce-
nario. This information is useful to understand the rela-
tionship of the IP addresses
Attack char-
acteristic
information
The mean of the targets per
attacker and the mean of at-
tackers per target
This information is useful to understand the characteristic
of the attack. For example, if the mean of targets per
attacker is high, it may indicate a reconnaissance attack.
Alternatively, if the mean of attackers per target is high,
it may indicate a DDoS attack
5. Experiments and Results
The IDS alerts used in the experiments were recorded in July 2012 by a commercial
network-based IDS deployed in a network with about 40,000 computers from the Univer-
sity of Maryland. Two experiments were performed. The first experiment (presented in
Section 5.1) uses all alerts of July 2012, the first half was applied in the offline correlator
and the second half was applied in the online correlator. The aim of the first experiment
is to analyze the general behavior of the proposed correlator. Therefore, it describes the
main clusters the offline correlator identified and the main hyper-alerts the online cor-
relator generated. On the other hand, the second experiment (presented in Section 5.2)
investigates how the size of the alert sample used in the offline correlation affects the
online correlation results.
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5.1. First Experiment – General experiments
The alerts triggered in the first 14 days of July 2012 were the input of the offline correlator
to generate the cluster model of attack strategies. The alerts triggered in the other days
of the month (from 15th to 31st of July 2012) were used to test the online correlator.
The maximum time difference between two alerts of an attack scenario was defined as 60
minutes for the offline and online correlator.
For the offline correlator, a total of 20,509 alerts were used as input. The aggrega-
tion step separated these 20,509 alerts into 895 attack scenarios. Then, the attack scenarios
that represent exceptional situations were filtered. An attack scenario was considered as
an exceptional situation if it contains only one alert or contains only alerts with the same
signature. These cases do not depict attack strategies used by attackers, as they show an
attack flow with a single step and do not provide enough information on the behavior of
the attacker. With this filtering, 3,796 alerts were removed, with 16,713 remaining alerts.
57 attack scenarios represent these 16,713 alerts. For each one of these 57 attack sce-
narios, the attack strategy graph was generated, and the similarity matrix was computed
using the proposed metric based on Jaccard index. Finally, the 57 attack strategy graphs
were separated into clusters by the hierarchical clustering technique.
A total of 12 clusters were generated, representing 12 attack strategy patterns.
Therefore, the problem of analysing 16,713 low-level alerts was simplified into the anal-
ysis of 12 meaningful clusters. The two clusters (Cluster 1 and Cluster 7) that represent
the most of the alerts were chosen to be further explained in this experiment. Cluster 1
covers 14,138 alerts (84.59% of the 16,713 alerts) and has 10 attack scenarios. Cluster 7
covers 2,317 alerts (13.86% of the 16,713 alerts) and has 12 attack scenarios. This means
that these two clusters cover 98.46% of the 16,713 alerts.
Cluster 1 is characterized by buffer overflow attacks. Figure 11 shows an example
of an attack strategy graph that composes Cluster 1. On the other hand, Cluster 7 is char-
acterized by reconnaissance attacks, such as the port scan Possible Nmap Scan (XMAS
(FIN PSH URG)), and the Fingerprinting Probe, which tries to ascertain the operational
system of the target. Figure 12 shows an example of an attack strategy graph that com-
poses Cluster 7.
Figure 11. Example of an attack strategy graph of the Cluster 1.
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Figure 12. Example of an attack strategy graph of the Cluster 7.
The union of all attack strategy graphs of a cluster is performed to represent an
attack strategy pattern visually. Figure 13 shows the attack strategy pattern of Cluster 7.
Figure 13. Union of the attack strategy graphs of the Cluster 7.
The alerts triggered From 15th to 31st of July 2012 were used for the online corre-
lator validation. In this period, 19,933 alerts were generated. To test the online correlation,
a simulator was developed to release the alerts one by one. As explained in Section 4, for
each new alert, it is verified to which attack scenario it belongs. After determining to
which attack scenario the new alert belongs, the attack strategy graph of this attack sce-
nario is updated with the new alert. Then, the updated attack strategy graph is associated
with one of the clusters generated by the offline correlator.
Therefore, this is a process where each attack scenario (and consequently each
attack strategy graph) changes as a new alert is added to it. A new attack strategy graph
(updated by only a few alerts) can be associated with a cluster at the beginning and, after
receiving a few more alerts, it can be associated with another cluster because the more
alerts are used to update the attack strategy graph, the more precise is its association.
A hyper-alert is considered closed when no alerts are added to its attack scenario
during 60 minutes. After that, no more alerts can be added to this attack scenario, and,
hence, to this hyper-alert. The closed hyper-alert is in its final state (its attributes will not
receive more updates). The cluster associated with the closed hyper-alert is denominated
final cluster.
After the experiments, the attack strategy graphs showed fast convergence into
their final cluster: we observed that an attack strategy graph is correctly associated with
its final cluster after an average of 1.54 associations with a standard deviation of 0.7. The
average of associations for an attack strategy graph is 8.73 with the standard deviation of
10.05 (the high standard deviation is due to the difference in the attack strategy graphs
size). Each new association is performed after the addition of a new alert that changes the
attack strategy graph.
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Interesting results were observed after analyzing the online correlator output: 16
out of 59 hyper-alerts were associated with the Cluster 1 and contained between 748 and
1209 alerts. Figure 14 represents one of the 16 hyper-alerts associated with Cluster 1. By
analyzing the time information of the hyper-alerts, we observed that these 16 hyper-alerts
were built during the night. Also, each one of the 16 hyper-alerts was generated once a
day (from 15th to 31st of July 2012), except in the day 29th. Moreover, by analyzing
the address and signature information of the hyper-alerts, we identified that the same
source IP address was responsible for about 70% of these alerts, which have the same
signature. The security analyst could have identified this pattern in the first days by using
the proposed approach. Since this problem is responsible for a significant amount of
alerts, the number of future alerts could have been reduced with the mitigation of this
situation.
Figure 14. Example of hyper-alert associated with Cluster 1.
13 hyper-alerts were associated with the Cluster 7 and had between 6 and 32
alerts. A significant pattern found in each of these hyper-alerts is the presence of a single
source IP address attacking multiple destination IP addresses. Figure 15 demonstrates
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the evolution of a hyper-alert associated with the Cluster 7 by showing its quantity of
alerts, best cluster, connected component and attack strategy graph. The IP addresses of
the connected components were changed to the labels from A to H for privacy purposes.
When the hyper-alert had only three alerts, it was associated with the Cluster 2. After
adding a new alert, the association of the hyper-alert changed to Cluster 7 and remained
on it until the end (when the hyper-alert was closed with seven alerts). This hyper-alert
shows an interesting pattern when its connected component is investigated: only one
source IP address is attacking other IP addresses. The mean of targets per attacker is 7,
which reinforces the characteristic of a reconnaissance attack. The attack strategy graph
of this hyper-alert is very similar to the attack strategy graph of the Cluster 7 (Figure 13).
Therefore, with 4 alerts, it was possible to infer that this hyper-alert had the same behavior
of other attacks on the Cluster 7.
Figure 15. Evolution of one hyper-alert associated with the Cluster 7.
Moreover, 74.58% of the hyper-alerts (44 of 59) presented association error lower
than 0.39. The lower the error, the better the similarity between the attack strategy and the
associated cluster. Figure 16 presents an example of an attack strategy associated with the
Cluster 7 with 0.42 association error. The attack strategy of the Figure 16 resembles the
Cluster 7 (Figure 13) even with association error higher than 0.39. These 44 hyper-alerts
covers 95.52% of the alerts (13468 of 14099 alerts). This result indicates that 74.58% of
the hyper-alerts (consequently 95.52% of the alerts) have similar attack strategies to the
attack strategy patterns identified by the offline correlator. Therefore, the hypothesis that
a previous attack strategy has good chances to repeat in the future is reinforced.
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Figure 16. Attack strategy graph associated with Cluster 7 with 0.42 association
error.
The offline correlator was able to organize the historical intrusion alerts into clus-
ters, simplifying the problem of analyzing many low-level alerts into the analysis of few
meaningful clusters. These clusters show the summarized information for each attack pat-
tern found in the related alerts and they were useful to support the online correlator. Two
main clusters that represent the majority of the alerts (98.46%) were identified, which
means that the majority of the attacks directed to this network are similar. The online
correlator was able to correlate the alerts in real time, organizing them into hyper-alerts
with meaningful information that may assist the response to security events. Through the
manual analysis of the hyper-alerts, we were able to find interesting patterns and under-
stand the attacks behavior, what would not be possible through the manual analysis of
the raw alerts. Also, we were able to understand the attack scenarios with only their first
alerts by analyzing the associated cluster of a given hyper-alert.
5.2. Second Experiment – Variations of sample size for offline correlation
This experiment aimed to investigate how the variations in the size of the alert sample for
offline correlation, affect the results of the online correlation.
Figure 17. Organization of the IDS alerts from July 2012 for each test.
In the beginning, six tests were performed. Figure 17 shows how they were orga-
nized: the alerts generated in July 2012 were separated into four weeks, i.e. A, B, C and
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D. In all six tests, the last week (D) was used in the online correlator to achieve a fair
comparison between all tests.
For the offline correlator, the test 1a used three weeks (A, B, C). The test 1b and
1c used two weeks: (A, B) and (B, C) respectively. The other three tests used one week:
(A), (B) and (C) respectively. This organization was intended to test how the amount and
the age of alerts (used in the offline phase) affect the association error in the online phase.
As an example, the test 1a was performed as following: the 23,121 alerts triggered
in the weeks A, B and C were used in the offline correlator to uncover the attack strategy
patterns that the attackers adopted in this period. The 23,121 alerts were separated into 91
attack scenarios using the connected component method, and the 91 attack scenarios gen-
erated 18 clusters of similar attack strategies. Therefore, 18 attack strategy patterns were
identified in these three weeks. Then, the week D was used in the online correlator. The
week D has 5,908 alerts distributed into 10 attack scenarios, and consequently 10 hyper-
alerts. Using the Ward’s method to compute the increased association error (presented in
Section 4.2), each one of the 10 hyper-alerts was associated with one attack strategy pat-
tern. A low error indicates that the hyper-alert could be properly matched to one of the 18
attack strategy patterns. The mean of the 10 association errors (one for each hyper-alert)
and their standard deviation were computed. This entire process was performed for all six
periods, generating the results of Table 4.
Table 4. Results of the six tests.
Test Weeks
Used for
Offline
Phase
Alerts
Count
Attack
Scenarios
Count
Clusters
Count
Mean of
Errors
Standard
Deviation
of Errors
1a ABC 23,121 91 18 0.15 0.08
1b AB 16,713 57 13 0.10 0.07
1c BC 12,659 65 16 0.12 0.08
1d A 10,462 26 7 0.11 0.08
1e B 6,251 31 10 0.11 0.07
1f C 6,408 34 9 0.13 0.09
Table 4 shows the results for all six tests. For each test, this table shows the test
name, the total amount of alerts used, the amount of attack scenarios constructed by the
connected component method, and the number of clusters in which those attack scenarios
were distributed in the offline correlator. The last two columns indicate the mean and
standard deviation of association errors for the hyper-alerts in the online correlator.
The biggest mean of association error was noticed in the test 1a, using all three
weeks (A, B, C) as input for the offline correlator. It means that adopting a longer period
for offline correlation does not necessarily generate lower association errors between the
hyper-alerts and attack strategy patterns.
Moreover, analyzing the last three tests (1d, 1e and 1f ), the test that used only
week A (older alerts) showed a smaller error than the test that used only week C (with
more recent alerts). Therefore, we observed that using more recent alerts in the offline
correlation do not necessarily give better results.
It is noteworthy that the error differences between all six tests are very low. This
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happened because the online correlator generated 7 hyper-alerts with the buffer overflow
pattern and 3 hyper-alerts with the reconnaissance pattern. Both attack strategy patterns
were present in the weeks A, B or C. Therefore, none hyper-alert in the week D had
a novel attack strategy pattern and all the 10 hyper-alerts were properly associated with
an attack strategy pattern with low association error, regardless the week used for offline
correlation.
Due to the low association errors for the six previous tests, we performed two new
tests (2a and 2b), using only one or two days instead of weeks. The aim of these two new
tests is to use a small sample of alerts and verify the influence of the age of alerts in the
association error. Test 2a was performed using the first day of July 2012, totalizing 1,917
older alerts. Test 2b was performed using the days 20th and 21st of July 2012, totalizing
1,820 more recent alerts. The days from 22nd to 28th were used in the online correlator
(same days of week D in the previous tests).
Table 5 shows the results for both tests. We observed that both tests identified the
buffer overflow and reconnaissance attack patterns in their clusters. Therefore, even with
a smaller sample of alerts in the offline correlation than in tests 1a to 1f , the results still
presented low association error (0.2 for the first day and 0.14 for the days 20th and 21st).
Furthermore, even with a greater amount of alerts, the test 2a (with older alerts) presented
higher association error when compared to the test 2b (with newer alerts).
Table 5. Results of the tests with days.
Test Days Used
for Offline
Phase
Alerts
Count
Attack
Scenarios
Count
Clusters
Count
Mean of
Errors
Standard
Devia-
tion of
Errors
2a 1st 1,917 6 3 0.20 0.07
2b 20th and
21st
1,820 11 4 0.14 0.04
Thereby, with a much smaller sample of alerts, the offline correlator was able to
identify enough attack strategy patterns to properly anticipate the nature of all the upcom-
ing hyper-alerts in the online correlator. It was possible due to the repetitive behavior of
the attacks on the same network. As the most of the attack strategies are repetitive, two
main benefits could be identified. The first one is the great capacity of anticipating the
nature of known attacks. The second one is related to the few attack strategies that do not
match any attack strategy pattern extracted in the offline phase. These attack strategies
can be easily disclosed since they present higher association errors than repetitive ones. It
is important to find these attack strategies because they represent unusual or novel attacker
behavior, which may pose a significant risk to the monitored systems.
6. Conclusion
To support the information security management, this paper addressed the problem of
correlating and analyzing the massive amount of intrusion alerts recorded by an IDS de-
vice. To deal with the challenges related to the huge amount of alerts generated by IDSs
and the low-level information provided, a new approach to assist the security analyst in
the intrusion alert analysis was proposed. The proposed approach is composed of two
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correlators: offline and online. The offline correlator can group past IDS alerts into attack
scenarios using the connected component separation method. Then, the attack strategy
graph of each scenario can be identified, and similar attack strategies are clustered to
uncover the attack strategy patterns. For this, a new method to measure the similarity
between two attack strategy graphs was proposed. The online correlator separates the
alerts into attack scenarios as the IDS triggers them. To describe each attack scenario,
one hyper-alert with many attributes is generated. The proposed approach was evaluated
using a real dataset from 2012 provided by the University of Maryland. The results of
the first experiment showed that the offline correlator simplified the problem of analyzing
many low-level alerts into the analysis of few clusters. Moreover, the online correlator
organized the upcoming alerts into a small amount of meaningful hyper-alerts, which are
information structures that describe a group of correlated alerts. The results of the second
experiment showed that, even with a small amount of data (i.e., data generated in two
days), the offline correlator could identify enough attack strategy patterns to support the
online correlator in generating hyper-alerts.
As future work, we intend to: (a) evaluate the proposed approach in other datasets
extracted from both real and experimental environments; (b) eliminate the necessity of
periodical execution of the offline correlator, which is possible using the online correlator
to update the offline knowledge base; (c) explore streaming mining techniques, that may
help to improve the aggregation step of our approach; (d) explore new statistical methods
to completely eliminate the necessity of manual parameters.
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